“Protesters in other countries are learning from events in Tunisia and Egypt, but so are regimes”

Dr. Isobel Coleman is a Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy Relations; Director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative; and Director of the Women and Foreign Policy Program. Dr Coleman spoke exclusively to The Fresh Outlook's Eva Fernandez about the current situation in Egypt and the latest Middle East revolution.

Eva: The government has rejected talk about "a transitional stage starting now" in Egypt, but anti-Mubarak activist say they won't go until he is gone. How is this situation likely to be resolved?

Dr Coleman: Everyone has been surprised by the speed with which events have unfolded on Egyptian streets. Much now depends on how long and how far the violence in Tahrir Square goes. Harsher clashes now sow the seeds of resentment once stability returns, which diminishes the chances of a more open, pluralistic society emerging from the revolution.

Extended violence also increases the chances that the military will step off the sidelines to restore order. There is a real disincentive for the army to use violence against the people, because that would forfeit the support and funding of the U.S. government. Nevertheless, that is the trade off the military leadership faces. If they do intervene to reimpose order, they will most likely install either a friendly member of the current regime or a transitional figure from among their own ranks.

The system that led to Mubarak’s rule was founded by the military, and as always, the military will act first and foremost to ensure its own survival. In other words, more violence closes the window of opportunity for a more democratic solution in Egypt.

Eva: Some media are suggesting that there is the possibility of a civil war in Egypt those who support the government and those who do not. How likely is it that this will happen?

Dr Coleman: Civil war implies a prolonged period of conflict, but this is something neither President Mubarak’s backers nor his opponents can afford. For those supporting the regime, the fact is that a transition of some sort will take place soon, whether through the success of the revolution, or military intervention, or the elections, or otherwise.

For the vast majority who want the regime out, the fact is that the Egyptian economy has ground to a halt, and the current situation can only last so long with banks, ATMs, schools, and stores closed, and with food diminishing and casualties increasing.

There are two more consequential splits we must worry about. The first is that which could occur within the military. If a rogue faction within the military decides to break with orders and use violence to end the uprising, the resulting system could indeed resemble the current regime or be even worse. The second is the gulf that is growing between the United States and Egypt. The Obama administration missed the opportunity to come down firmly on the side of the revolution, and now events on the street have outpaced it. Mubarak has resorted to unleashing chaos on the population, and rebuffed U.S. attempts to communicate. This may have negative consequences for U.S.-Egyptian relations once stability returns.

Eva: More than 20,000 anti-government protesters gathered in the Yemen on February 3 for a "day of rage" against President Ali Abdullah Saleh. It seems that revolutions against old regimes have been succeeding in the Middle East, of which Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen are all examples. Are these events related? How can this domino effect be explained?

Dr Coleman: The overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia lent inspiration and momentum to events in Egypt, but they merely ignited deeper preconditions long in place, particularly economic grievances and lack of free expression.

Protesters in other countries are learning from events in Tunisia and Egypt, but so are regimes. Saleh in Yemen and Abdullah in Jordan have attempted to get out ahead of unrest by promising reforms and sacking cabinets. Any “domino effect” from here will be limited for this reason and because monarchies in the region have shown themselves to be more stable than dictatorships.

By Eva Fernandez